Weakly-Popular and Super-Popular Matchings with Ties and Their Connection to Stable Matchings

In this paper, we study a slightly different definition of popularity in bipartite graphs $G=(U,W,E)$ with two-sided preferences, when ties are present in the preference lists. This is motivated by the observation that if an agent $u$ is indifferent between his original partner $w$ in matching $M$ and his new partner $w'\ne w$ in matching $N$, then he may probably still prefer to stay with his original partner, as change requires effort, so he votes for $M$ in this case, instead of being indifferent. We show that this alternative definition of popularity, which we call weak-popularity allows us to guarantee the existence of such a matching and also to find a weakly-popular matching in polynomial-time that has size at least $\frac{3}{4}$ the size of the maximum weakly popular matching. We also show that this matching is at least $\frac{4}{5}$ times the size of the maximum (weakly) stable matching, so may provide a more desirable solution than the current best (and tight under certain assumptions) $\frac{2}{3}$-approximation for such a stable matching. We also show that unfortunately, finding a maximum size weakly popular matching is NP-hard, even with one-sided ties and that assuming some complexity theoretic assumptions, the $\frac{3}{4}$-approximation bound is tight. Then, we study a more general model than weak-popularity, where for each edge, we can specify independently for both endpoints the size of improvement the endpoint needs to vote in favor of a new matching $N$. We show that even in this more general model, a so-called $\gamma$-popular matching always exists and that the same positive results still hold. Finally, we define an other, stronger variant of popularity, called super-popularity, where even a weak improvement is enough to vote in favor of a new matching. We show that for this case, even the existence problem is NP-hard

Popular and Dominant Matchings with Uncertain, Multilayer and Aggregated Preferences

We study the Popular Matching problem in multiple models, where the preferences of the agents in the instance may change or may be unknown/uncertain. In particular, we study an Uncertainty model, where each agent has a possible set of preferences, a Multilayer model, where there are layers of preference profiles, a Robust model, where any agent may move some other agents up or down some places in his preference list and an Aggregated Preference model, where votes are summed over multiple instances with different preferences. We study both one-sided and two-sided preferences in bipartite graphs. In the one-sided model, we show that all our problems can be solved in polynomial time by utilizing the structure of popular matchings. We also obtain nice structural results. With two-sided preferences, we show that all four above models lead to NP-hard questions for popular matchings. By utilizing the connection between dominant matchings and stable matchings, we show that in the robust and uncertainty model, a certainly dominant matching in all possible prefernce profiles can be found in polynomial-time, whereas in the multilayer and aggregated models, the problem remains NP-hard for dominant matchings too. We also answer an open question about $d$-robust stable matchings

A Simple 1.5-Approximation Algorithm for a Wide Range of Max-SMTI Generalizations

We give a simple approximation algorithm for a common generalization of many previously studied extensions of the stable matching problem with ties. These generalizations include the existence of critical vertices in the graph, amongst whom we must match as much as possible, free edges, that cannot be blocking edges and $\Delta$-stabilities, which mean that for an edge to block, the improvement should be large enough on one or both sides. We also introduce other notions to generalize these even further, which allows our framework to capture many existing and future applications. We show that our edge duplicating technique allows us to treat these different types of generalizations simultaneously, while also making the algorithm, the proofs and the analysis much simpler and shorter then in previous approaches. In particular, we answer an open question by \cite{socialstable} about the existence of a $\frac{3}{2}$-approximation algorithm for the \smti\ problem with free edges. This demonstrates well that this technique can grasp the underlying essence of these problems quite well and have the potential to be able to solve countless future applications as well

Computational complexity of kk-stable matchings

We study deviations by a group of agents in the three main types of matching markets: the house allocation, the marriage, and the roommates models. For a given instance, we call a matching $k$-stable if no other matching exists that is more beneficial to at least $k$ out of the $n$ agents. The concept generalizes the recently studied majority stability. We prove that whereas the verification of $k$-stability for a given matching is polynomial-time solvable in all three models, the complexity of deciding whether a $k$-stable matching exists depends on $\frac{k}{n}$ and is characteristic to each model.Comment: SAGT 202

Solving the Maximum Popular Matching Problem with Matroid Constraints

We consider the problem of finding a maximum popular matching in a many-to-many matching setting with two-sided preferences and matroid constraints. This problem was proposed by Kamiyama (2020) and solved in the special case where matroids are base orderable. Utilizing a newly shown matroid exchange property, we show that the problem is tractable for arbitrary matroids. We further investigate a different notion of popularity, where the agents vote with respect to lexicographic preferences, and show that both existence and verification problems become NP-hard, even in the $b$-matching case.Comment: 16 pages, 2 figure

Short Proof of a Theorem of Brylawski on the Coefficients of the Tutte Polynomial

In this short note we show that a system $M=(E,r)$ with a ground set $E$ of size $m$ and (rank) function $r: 2^E\to \mathbb{Z}_{\geq 0}$ satisfying $r(S)\leq \min(r(E),|S|)$ for every set $S\subseteq E$, the Tutte polynomial $$T_M(x,y):=\sum_{S\subseteq E}(x-1)^{r(E)-r(S)}(y-1)^{|S|-r(S)},$$ written as $T_M(x,y)=\sum_{i,j}t_{ij}x^iy^j$, satisfies that for any integer $h \geq 0$, we have $$\sum_{i=0}^h\sum_{j=0}^{h-i}\binom{h-i}{j}(-1)^jt_{ij}=(-1)^{m-r}\binom{h-r}{h-m},$$ where $r=r(E)$, and we use the convention that when $h<m$, the binomial coefficient $\binom{h-r}{h-m}$ is interpreted as $0$. This generalizes a theorem of Brylawski on matroid rank functions and $h<m$, and a theorem of Gordon for $h\leq m$ with the same assumptions on the rank function. The proof presented here is significantly shorter than the previous ones. We only use the fact that the Tutte polynomial $T_M(x,y)$ simplifies to $(x-1)^{r(E)}y^{|E|}$ along the hyperbola $(x-1)(y-1)=1$.Comment: 4 page

Geometria a modern fizikában

Rövid ismertető a geometria és a modern fizika kapcsolatára, a kvantummechanika és a speciális relativitáselméleten keresztü

Complexity of Stable Matching Problems

INST: L_200The thesis explores the stable matching problem and its generalizations, with many of the theorems being new results of the author. The first section studies the original variant of the stable marriage problem and its structure. The second section explores the stable roommates problem and describes the novel algorithm of Irving to solve it. The rest of the thesis deals with more abstract generalizations, where most cases become NP or PPAD-hard, but the thesis also shows some tractable cases